

SECRET**PERSONNEL PROBLEMS****PROBLEM 1: The Availability of Agency Personnel to Serve as Instructors in the Office of Training.**

- a. The Office of Training now has 28 instructor position vacancies which should be filled by experienced intelligence officers from DD/P, for the most part, and in lesser numbers from DD/I and DD/S. Thus far, the Office of Training has been unsuccessful in obtaining sufficient numbers of eligible candidates from other offices of the Agency to fill these vacancies and to replace those non-OTR career designees whose 30-month tours with the Office of Training have expired.
- b. Office of Training career designees, serving as instructors, some of whom have not rotated since 1950, need to have their intelligence and operational experience replenished in order to achieve a proper balance as instructors between theory and practice. The Office of Training Career Service Board has inaugurated a Career Development Program which provides for the development of a five-year plan for each career designee of the Office of Training. Normally, the plans provide for at least one rotational tour of duty, of 12 months' minimum duration, to another component of the Agency. It is impossible to put these career plans into effect, without interference with the training schedule of the Office unless experienced operational and intelligence personnel, as replacements, are made available to the Office of Training on a man for man basis.
- c. Resolution of this problem requires acceptance within the Agency of a policy that tours of duty with the Office of Training are necessary and desirable in the interests of the Agency, and that other Career Service Boards will accept OTR rotatees for duty in their components and will replace such rotatees with their own career designees for equivalent tours of duty in each case.
- d. Since personnel are controlled at the division level in DD/P, the Office of Training encounters difficulties in exercising exchanges and rotation of personnel on an equitable or quid-pro-quo basis; for example, an OTR instructor may be released to Division A, but the most qualified replacement may be found in Division B. Without centralized control of Clandestine Services personnel it is extremely difficult to negotiate exchanges on a truly equitable basis.
- e. In summary, therefore, this problem breaks down into the following steps: Office of Training existing vacancies of instructional personnel should be filled by experienced and qualified personnel who have the capability to serve as instructors from DD/P, DD/S and DD/I components of the Agency. Secondly, the replacement of non-OTR career designees whose tours of duty with the Office of Training approach expiration

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should be replaced on a systematic basis; and finally, OTR career designees who require replenishment of their intelligence, operational and support experience should be permitted to rotate to other components of the Agency on a man for man replacement basis for equivalent tours of duty in each case.

PROBLEM 2: The Junior Officer Training Program.

Some improvements to the JOT Program can be made with substantial benefit to the Agency. For the most part the JOT Program suffers from deficiencies in the recruitment effort of the Agency. Currently the Office of Training is authorized at all times to encumber [redacted] slots for JOT's undergoing military training and service and 90 JOT slots for non-Military personnel. As of 1 March 1955 only [redacted] military slots were encumbered and 41 civilian JOT slots were encumbered, making a total of [redacted] personnel in the JOT Program and [redacted] in the pipeline or a grand total of [redacted] as against a possible [redacted]. The recruitment effort is not commensurate with the recruitment load for JOT's and Agency requirements for JOT's exceed the supply. The following steps are deemed to be effective ways and means of improving this situation:

a. There is at present no incentive system for recruiters to place emphasis on the quality of personnel selected, ahead of quantity. For example, it takes 4 to 6 times as much work to identify and recruit a JOT as it does to select other professional or clerical personnel for the Agency. Priority is now given to recruitment of operational vacancies. Under an incentive system, and with a larger recruitment effort greater numbers of JOT's could be fed into the Agency system.

b. The inability of the Department of Army to absorb its ROTC personnel affords a unique opportunity to the Agency in exploiting a source of potential JOT personnel. The shortage of recruiters has made it impossible for the Agency to exploit this source of manpower.

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d. While arrangements have been made by the Office of Training to establish a network of [redacted] members of various colleges and universities throughout the country, this network requires more frequent stimulation than it is now getting. While the network is productive,

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it could be made more so by personal or written contacts. If the Office of Personnel could devote the time necessary to stimulate the network to greater activities, it would result in the availability of greater numbers of high potential Agency personnel.

- e. If priority were given to fill the currently authorized JOT slots, the deployment of these additionally trained and fully cleared JOT's would simultaneously alleviate current personnel shortages and result in improved on-the-job performance in the Agency.

PROBLEM 3: Extension of Field Recruitment Facilities.

At the present time a majority of applicants for duty with CIA are processed in this order: interviews by the Office of Personnel; testing of all locally-hired clerical people and a minority of professional people; security investigation; medical examination; polygraph; general personnel processing, including testing of perhaps a majority of professionals. One difficulty with this processing is that the majority of professional applicants are tested after they are on board. Obviously, the testing program would have more effectiveness if it were conducted prior to employment. Plans are being formulated by the Assessment and Evaluation Staff, Office of Training, in cooperation with the Office of Personnel, which will make this possible. Apart from this question, the above system of processing violates an axiom of personnel people, namely that, other things being equal, the least expensive parts of processing should be put first in the procedure. Whenever security processing is put early, the risk is taken that a process costing in the thousands of dollars is wasted because of rejection by a process which is relatively inexpensive, e.g., medical or psychological examination.

- a. Bringing people to Washington at Agency expense for medical and psychological examinations and personnel interviewing prior to putting into security processing would probably be equally expensive. Decentralization of the medical and psychological examinations and any interviewing necessary might well be practicable.
- b. The Assessment and Evaluation Staff, Office of Training, is in the process of decentralizing its Junior Officer Trainee testing through such decentralization. It is already clear that this decentralization procedure will work for this particular examination. If through consultants or Agency staff a similar decentralization could be accomplished for other elements of the procedure, it is highly probable that the savings might reach a very large figure.
- c. It is understood that the State Department has already resorted to a decentralized system.

PROBLEM 4: Numbering System for Personnel.

Assigning individuals a serial number so they can be identified with certainty in files generally and in IBM files specifically is an essential whenever

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records are to be consulted and used for individual purposes. Defense organizations have long had a serial numbering system. CIA has a confusion of numbers. I do not know how many exist, but I am aware that payroll has one numbering system, personnel another, and the Assessment and Evaluation Staff, Office of Training, will be spending [redacted] per year assigning numbers of individuals receiving Fitness Reports, individuals tested for one or another purpose, and individuals who register for OTR courses. This estimate is based on an average of [redacted] Fitness Reports, Training Evaluations, and test papers being processed, an estimate which is conservative. If one adds to this [redacted] weeks the time other offices are spending in assigning numbers, the possibilities for saving become large. It is urged that a serial number be assigned to the individual on entrance on duty, this number to be used consistently throughout his career for all purposes.

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PROBLEM 5: Inconsistencies in the Personnel and Operational Objectives of the Agency.

- a. Recently the Director of Central Intelligence has reiterated that the Agency has too many people. In spite of all efforts being made to weed out the unfit and the mediocre, experience indicates that it is difficult indeed to accomplish this objective.
- b. At the same time the Director of Central Intelligence has repeated that we are accepting more and more responsibilities and commitments.
- c. The Jackson Committee report strongly recommended that the Agency concentrate now upon building a fully trained and operationally effective clandestine capability, and to do this we should cut-back upon operational commitments until our personnel were sufficiently well trained to carry out our tasks successfully. The Inspector General, the Doolittle and Clark Committees have all recommended that increased emphasis be placed upon training of Agency personnel. The operating offices agree in principle, but they have not been relieved of their operational commitments so that their personnel can be spared for adequate training.
- d. In view of this situation it is strongly recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence advise the Bureau of the Budget that contrary to having sufficient personnel, the Agency requires a [redacted] overall increase in strength for the next 3 to 5 years in order to accomplish adequate training of its personnel for the increased operational commitments it has accepted.

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PROBLEM 6: Personnel and Training Concepts of CIA have been Incorporated into Operating Programs in the Department of State.

- a. Office of Training concepts such as the JOT Program and its techniques of recruitment, decentralized testing and selection of personnel, the collegiate spotter programs, and basic training principles have been incorporated in the Wriston Committee report on the Foreign Service of

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the United States. This occurred as a consequence of the presence on the task force of the Chief, Basic School, Office of Training, [REDACTED]

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b. The Department of State is now moving rapidly to put these ideas into effect; for example:

- (1) The planned level of Department of State recruitment, aiming at an estimated annual intake, after 1955, of around 250 class 6 officers per year, is to be worked out on a flexible quota basis this year.
- (2) The examination procedure for the Foreign Service has been revised; some 65 examination points have been established in the States and Territories, plus all Foreign Service posts abroad; and two examinations are to be conducted this year.
- (3) Up to fifteen recruiting teams of two men each have been working since early this year, covering every college and university of any significance in the U. S., including agricultural and technical schools. Some [REDACTED] candidates are expected to apply for the first of the year's examinations in June, and another exam will be offered in the autumn. Hereafter, it will be an annual affair. It is the Department's objective to meet substantially all its junior officer requirements hereafter, for service at home and abroad, through this program.

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c. Query: Why is State so far ahead of CIA in putting CIA developed ideas into effect?

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